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IMMIGRATION POLICY V. LABOR POLICY: AN ANALYSIS OF
THE APPLICATION OF DOMESTIC LABOR LAWS TO
UNAUTHORIZED FOREIGN WORKERS
t
Konrad Batog

I.

Introduction

When unauthorized foreign workers' are subjected to unlawful labor practices,
a potential or perceived conflict between national immigration policy and national labor policy arises. This problem is especially pronounced when a central
principle of a country's immigration policy is the prevention of the employment
of unauthorized aliens. The apparent tension occurs because countries aim to
protect all workers within their borders by enforcing labor standards. At the
same time, they desire to discourage entry and employment of unauthorized
workers in order to preserve jobs and wages for the country's authorized
2
workers.
In Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, the United States Supreme
Court held that combating the employment of unauthorized aliens was central to
the United States immigration policy after passage of the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA"). 3 The court noted that this policy was furthered "by establishing an extensive 'employment verification system' designed
to deny employment to aliens who (a) are not lawfully present in the United
States, or (b) are not lawfully authorized to work in the United States. ' 4 The
foundation of such a system is an employer sanctions regime that punishes employers who hire unauthorized individuals or fail to determine if an employee is
5
eligible to work in the United States.
This paper will examine how the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and South Korea dealt with issues arising out of a possible conflict between national labor policy and national immigration policy by way of enforcing
domestic labor laws for unauthorized foreign workers. These specific countries
t Konrad Batog is a January 2006 Juris Doctor of Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
B.A., Syracuse University, 1999. Konrad currently works as a Federal Investigator for the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission Chicago District Office. This article represents the views of the
author, and does not represent the views of the EEOC.
I Throughout this paper, I will use the term undocumented worker or unauthorized worker to mean a
foreign alien who is illegally residing and working in a country.
2 Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 893 (1984); Phillip Martin & Mark Miller, Employer
Sanctions: French, German and U.S. Experiences I (Sept. 2000) (unpublished comment, on file with Int'l
Labour Office of Geneva); Georges Tapinos, Irregular Migration: Economic and Political Issues, in
COMBATING THE ILLEGAL EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN WORKERS

13, 13-43 (Organization for Econ. Co-

Operation and Dev., 2000).
3 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002) (citing INS v. Nat'l Ctr. for
Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194, n.8 (1991)).
4

Id.

5 See id. at 147-48.
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will be examined because they all have employer sanctions laws that punish employers who hire and employ unauthorized individuals or fail to determine if an
employee is eligible to work.6 While countries that do not have an employer
sanctions regime may seek to limit unauthorized employment of undocumented
workers, employer sanctions are evidence that combating unauthorized employment is central to a country's immigration policy. 7 Though the countries with
employer sanctions regimes are numerous, a complete analysis of how these
countries treat conflicts between immigration and labor policy in the enforcement
8
of labor laws for unauthorized foreign workers is beyond the scope of this paper.
As a result, this paper's examination will be limited to the countries mentioned
above.
This examination will be valuable because these states share similarities in
their economies and rates of immigration. 9 The World Bank lists the four countries as "high income" economies. 10 Indeed, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany are three of the top four nations in gross national income and
gross domestic product." South Korea is ranked twelfth in gross national income and eleventh in gross domestic product.1 2 In terms of immigration, in 2002
the United Kingdom admitted 513,000 immigrants,' 3 and the United States admitted 1,063,732 immigrants. 1 4 In the same year, 842,543 1immigrants
entered
6
Germany,' 5 and South Korea admitted 170,873 immigrants.
6 Id. at 148; Mark Miller, Employer Sanctions in France: From the Campaign Against Illegal Alien
Employment to the Campaign Against Illegal Work 27-29 (1995) (unpublished comment, on file with the
U.S. Comm'n on Immigration Reform).
7 See Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147.
8 The author has identified through various sources the following countries with either civil, criminal, or both civil and criminal employer sanctions: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Costa
Rica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan,
Thailand, and the United Kingdom. See Martin & Miller, supra note 2; Miller, supra note 6; M. Isabel
Medina, Employer Sanctions in the United States, Canada and Mexico: Exploring the Criminalizationof
Immigration Law, 3 Sw.J.L. & TRADE AM. 333, 340 n.28 (Fall 1996); Legal Status and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, 18/03 Op. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (2003).
9 World Bank Group, Data & Statistics: Total GDP 2004, http:l/www.worldbank.org/datalcountry
class/classgroups.htm#Highjincome (last visited Nov. 17, 2004); Office for National Statistics, International Migration: Migrant's Entering or Leaving the United Kingdom and England and Wales, 2002
(April 29, 2004), available at http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/Product.asp?vlnk=507 [hereinafter
Office for National Statistics]; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2002, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington D.C., 2003, at 7 [hereinafter 2002 Yearbook].
10 World Bank Group, Data & Statistics: Total GDP 2004, http://www.worldbank.org/data/country
class/classgroups.htm#Highincome (last visited Nov. 17, 2004).
"1 World Bank Group, Data & Statistics: Total GNI 2004, http://www.worldbank.org/data/databy
topic/GNI.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2004); World Bank Group, Data & Statistics, http://www.worldbank.
org/data/databytopic/GDP.pdf.
12 World Bank Group, Data & Statistics: Total GDP 2004, supra note 10; World Bank Group, Data
& Statistics: Total GNI 2004, supra note 11.
13 Office for National Statistics, supra note 9.

14 2002 Yearbook, supra note 9.
15 BUNDESMINISTERIUM
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BUNDESREGIERUNO 10 (2004), available at http://www.bmi.bund.de/cln_012/nn_121894/Intemet/Con-
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Part II will examine the United States and the United Kingdom, which do not
provide the same labor protections to undocumented workers as to authorized
workers. Sections II.A and II.B include an analysis of how each respective country deals with unlawful labor practices towards undocumented workers. Section
II.C will evaluate how these two countries are similar in their treatment of labor
laws for undocumented workers and critiques the approach adopted by both. Part
III will apply the same methodology to countries that provide equivalent labor
protections to undocumented workers and authorized workers, namely Germany
in Section III.A and South Korea in Section III.B. The examination will focus on
domestic laws and policies instead of international instruments pertaining to foreign workers because international measures have had little effect on alleviating
the plight of foreign workers. 17 Part IV concludes by suggesting that national
immigration policy does not have to trump or conflict with national labor policy,
even when a country utilizes employer sanctions.
II.

Countries that have Different Labor Protections for Undocumented

Workers and Authorized Workers
A.

United States of America

The United States adopted employer sanctions as part of national immigration
policy through IRCA 18 and made it unlawful to: (1) hire, recruit, or receive compensation for referring an alien to work in the United States, if it is known that
the alien is unauthorized; (2) continue to employ the alien in the United States,
knowing the alien is (or has become) unauthorized; and (3) fail to examine documents establishing both employment authorization and identity. 19 A good faith
provides an
attempt to comply with IRCA's document verification requirements
20
act.
the
of
violations
alleged
to
defense
a
employer with
IRCA provides for both civil and criminal sanctions against employers.2 1 An
employer is subject to a fine of up to $2,000 for each undocumented worker in its
employ. The fine rises to $10,000 for each undocumented worker if the emtent/Common/Anlagen/Broschueren/2004/Migrationsbericht__2004,templateld=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/Migrationsbericht_2004 [hereinafter MIGRA'rON REvIEw 2004].
16 Korea National Statistical Office: International Migration in 2003, http://www.nso.go.kr/eng/releases/report-view.html?num=368 (last visited Jan. 28, 2006). While South Korea appears to have admitted a great deal less immigrants than the United States, United Kingdom, or Germany, South Korea is
comparatively much smaller in many respects than these other three countries. So, that, for example, as a
percentage of a country's population, South Korea admitted almost exactly the same percentage as the
United States. See World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision, http://www.un.org/esa/population/
publications/wpp2002/WPP2002-HIGHLIGHTSrev l.PDF (last visited Nov. 14, 2005). As a percentage
of these four countries' populations, Germany has the highest level of immigration followed by the
United Kingdom, and then the United States, and South Korea. Id.
17 Martin Ruhs, Temporary Foreign Worker Programmes: Policies, Adverse Consequences, and the
Need to Make Them Work 13 (2002) (unpublished comment, on file with the Univ. of Cal., San Diego),
available at http://repositories.cdlib.orglccis/papers/wrkg56.
18 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2005).
19 Id. at § 1324a(a); Id. at § 1324a(b).
20 Id. at § 1324a(a)(3).

21 Id. at § 1324a(e); Id. at § 1324a(f).
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ployer has previously violated IRCA. 22 Criminal penalties of up to six months
a pattern or practice of employing
imprisonment are available in cases where
23
established.
is
workers
undocumented
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") is the government
agency responsible for investigating and enforcing the employer sanctions. 24 In
2003, ICE conducted 2,194 employer investigations and issued 162 notices of
intent to fine, only 124 of which resulted in fines. 25 This is an extreme decline
from 1997, when 7,537 investigations were conducted, 865 intentions to fine
were issued, and 778 final orders were issued. 26 The number of work site investigation cases also declined eighty percent between 1998 and 2001.27 Additionally, the number of undocumented workers arrested as a result of work site
investigations has decreased tremendously. 28 While such investigations yielded
17,554 arrests in 1997, there were only 445 arrests in 2003.29
Some administrative agencies that enforce U.S. labor laws have argued that
30
those laws apply to workers regardless of whether or not they are documented.
One example is the U.S. Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division
("WHD"), which is responsible for administering and enforcing labor laws such
as minimum wage, overtime, and child labor provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). 3t It also enforces employment-related protections for migrant and seasonal agricultural workers under the Migrant and Seasonal
Agricultural Worker Protection Act ("MSPA"). 32 The MSPA was created to ensure that employers of migrant workers pay them wages, provide certain safety
conditions, and comply with the terms of working contracts. 33 The WHD has
22 Id. at § 1324a(e).
23 Id. at § 1324a(f).
24 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2003, U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington D.C., 2004, at 144-45. [hereinafter 2003 Yearbook]
25 Id. at 157. The Notice of Intent to Fine shall contain the basis for the charge(s) against the [employer], the statutory provisions alleged to have been violated, and the monetary amount of the penalty
[ICE] intends to impose. If the [employer] does not file a written request for a hearing within 60 days of
service of the Notice of Intent to Fine, [ICE] shall issue a final order from which there shall be no appeal.
8 C.F.R. § 270.2 (2005).
26 2003 Yearbook, supra note 24, at 157.
27 Id. at 147.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 157.

30 There are three major types of labor laws: (i) labor relations laws that give workers rights to
organize and bargain collectively; (ii) protective labor laws that establish minimum wages, maximum
hours of work, and establish eligibility for work-related benefits such as unemployment insurance, and
(iii) sanctions and antidiscrimination laws that prohibit employers from hiring or retaining unauthorized
aliens or using prohibited criteria such as race or sex to hire, promote and lay off workers. Martin &
Miller, supra note 2, at 2.
31 29 U.S.C. § 201 (2005).
32 Id.

33 29 U.S.C. § 1801 (2005).
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specifically stated that it will34 enforce the FLSA and the MPSA irrespective of an
employee's documentation.
While the WHD intends to enforce labor laws for unauthorized workers, federal courts have denied undocumented workers some of the most critical remedies under both state and federal labor laws. The most significant decision was
the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v.
NLRB. 35 Hoffman held that because IRCA "'forcefully' made combating the
employment of illegal aliens central to '[t]he policy of immigration law,"' unauthorized workers could not receive back pay remedies under the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA") when they were illegally discharged for organizing unions. 36 The Court reasoned that awarding back pay to an undocumented worker
was contrary to the policy of IRCA, as it would condone and encourage undocumented workers to illegally stay and work in the United States. 37 The Supreme
Court also concluded that the National Labor Relations Board, which enforces
the NLRA laws, was "prohibited from effectively rewarding a violation of the
immigration
laws by reinstating workers not authorized to reenter the United
38
States."
The Court's holding affected how some administrative agencies evaluate remedies available to undocumented workers. Prior to Hoffman, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), which enforces employment antidiscrimination laws, unequivocally argued that "unauthorized workers who are
subjected to unlawful employment discrimination are entitled to the same relief
as other victims of discrimination. '' 39 However, after Hoffman, the EEOC stated
in its compliance manual that while employers cannot discriminate against undocumented workers, relief for undocumented workers may be limited. 40 Additionally, one federal appellate court has ruled that IRCA completely prevents
41
undocumented workers from any relief under federal anti-discrimination laws.
Following Hoffman, U.S. federal and state courts have ruled that relief under
other labor laws is also unavailable to undocumented workers. 42 For example,
undocumented workers have been denied back pay and front pay for violations of
the FLSA, which goes against the advice of the WHD. 43 In New York, one state
34 U.S. Department of Labor: Employment Standards Administration Wage and Hour Division, Fact
Sheet #48: Application of U.S. Labor Laws to Immigrant Workers: Effect of Hoffman Plastics Decision
on Laws Enforced by the Wage and Hour Division, available at http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/
whd/whdfs48.htm (last updated Oct. 4, 2004).
35 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
36 Id. at 147 (citing Nat'l Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. at 194, n. 8).
37 Id. at 149-51.

38 Id. at 145 (citing Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 903 (1984)).
39 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, SECTION 622: CmIZENSHIP, RESIDENCY, REQUIREMENTS, ALIENS AND UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS
40 EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N,

2 (2000).

EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL,

SECTION 13: NA-

21, n.61 (2002).
41 Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 1998).
42 Renteria v. Italia Foods, Inc., No. 02 C 495, 2003 WL 21995190, (N.D. Il.Aug. 21, 2003) at *6.

TIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION

43 Id.
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district court following Hoffman denied undocumented workers any kind of relief
under state health and safety laws. 4 4 Undocumented workers also have been denied remuneration under state worker's compensation laws, as courts have concluded that under the Hoffiman rationale,
IRCA preempts undocumented workers
45
from receiving certain types of relief.
B.

United Kingdom

The Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996, which introduced employer sanctions in the United Kingdom, went into effect on January 27, 1997.46 Under the
statute, an employer is guilty of an offense if it employs a person subject to
immigration control who has attained the age of 16, and (a) the employee has not
been granted leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, or (b) the employee's leave is not valid and subsisting, or is subject to a condition precluding
him from accepting the employment. 47 The Act also requires employers to check
the identity and work authorization of employees and new hires. 4 8 An employer
can escape sanctions if it can prove that it saw and kept a copy of documentation
that seemed to relate to the job applicant and appeared to prove that the applicant
49
was entitled to work in the United Kingdom.

The British statute only provides for civil sanctions. An employer found
guilty of an offense is liable for a fine of up to 5,000 pounds ($9,405).5 0 The
U.K. Immigration and Nationality Directorate is responsible for enforcing employer sanctions. From 1998 until 2002, there were twenty-two enforcement actions against employers who employed undocumented workers, of which eight
resulted in convictions. 5' In 2002, there were only two enforcement actions and
one conviction. 52 While there are no
official statistics for 2003, evidence shows
53
that enforcement has not increased.
There is little case law on how the United Kingdom enforces labor laws in
regards to undocumented workers. One recent decision by the Court of Appeal
44 Majlinger v. Cassino Contracting Corp., 766 N.Y.S.2d 332, 333 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003).
45 Marjorie A. Shields, Application of Workers' Compensation Laws to Illegal Aliens, 121 A.L.R. 5th
523 (2004); Jason Schumann, Working in the Shadows: Illegal Aliens' Entitlement to State Workers'
Compensation, 89 IOWA L. REV. 709, 724 -26 (2004).
46 Martin & Miller, supra note 2, at 1.
47 Asylum and Immigration Act, 1996, c. 49, § 8 (Eng.).
48 Id.; HOME OFFICE, CHANGES TO THE LAW ON PREVENTING

ILLEGAL WORKING: SHORT GUIDANCE

FOR UNITED KINGDOM EMPLOYERS 4-5 (April 2004) [hereinafter HOME OFFICE, CHANGES], available at

http://www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk/ind/en/home/0/preventing-illega.Maincontent.0004.file.tmp/changes
_to_law.pdf.

49 Asylum and Immigration Act, 1996 c. 49, § 8(2) (Eng.).
50 HOME OFFICE, CHANGES, supra note 48, at 8.
51 HOME OFFICE, CONTROL OF IMMIGRATION: STATISTICS UNITED KINGDOM 2002 (Nov. 27, 2003)

[hereinafter HOME OFFICE, CONTROL], available at www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/immigrationl.html.
52 Id.
53 HOME AFFAIRS COMM.,

SECOND REPORT OF SESSION

2003-04: ASYLUM APPLICATIONS 77-82

(2004), availableat www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmhaff/218/218.pdf.
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(Civil Division) in Vakante v. Addey & Stanhope School,54 [2004] EWCA (Civ)
1065 (Eng.) at para. 24, 27, indicates that the United Kingdom is also limiting
labor law remedies for undocumented workers. 55 In Vakante, the plaintiff, a Croatian citizen, appealed a decision of an employment tribunal, which held that he
of emwas barred by his illegal immigration status from bringing a complaint
56
ployment discrimination against the defendant secondary school.
Mr. Vakante, an asylum seeker who was not permitted to take up employment
in the United Kingdom, applied for a position as a teacher at Addey and Stanhope School. 57 He knowingly entered false information on his application form
about his ability to be legally employed in the United Kingdom without a work
permit.5 8 He worked for the school for eight months before being discharged.5 9
Mr. Vakante was found guilty of violating section 24 of the Immigration Act of
1971 because he did not abide by his conditional stay in the United Kingdom,
which prohibited him from working. 60 Following his dismissal, Mr. Vakante
filed a claim against the school, alleging race and national origin discrimination
for training, benefits,
on the grounds that he was not given equal opportunities
61
services and facilities, in addition to being discharged.
Because Mr. Vakante violated section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971 by
obtaining and continuing employment, the claim was dismissed by the courts that
heard his case. 62 The Employment Tribunal first held that Mr. Vakante was precluded from relief because the claims were "so closely connected with the deliberate illegality of that contract on Mr. Vakante's part that were the tribunal to
allow the originating application to go forward to a hearing, it would appear to be
endorsing the applicant's illegal actions. '' 63 The Employment Appeal Tribunal
agreed. 64 The Court of Appeal (Civil Division) likewise held that Mr. Vakante
could not pursue his complaints of discrimination where those complaints were
so inextricably bound with his own illegal conduct that if the tribunal permitted
complaints, it would give the appearance of condoning the
him to pursue the
65
illegal conduct.
54 The Court of Appeal (Civil Division) is the intermediary appellate court for civil cases. The next
higher appellate court would be the House of Lords which is the supreme court of appeal. Sarah Carter,
A Guide of the UK Legal System-Updated, http://www.llrx.com/features/uk2.htm (last visited Nov. 13,

2004).
55 See generally Vakante v. Addey & Stanhope Sch., [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1065 (Eng.).
56 Id. at para. 10, 12.
57 Id. at para. 12-13.
58 Id. at para. 13.
59 Id. at para. 14.
60 Id. at para. 18.
61 Id. at para. 15-16. Under the Race Relations Act 1976, it is illegal to treat a person less favorably

than another person on the basis of color, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins of the person.
Race Relations Act 1976, 1976 c. 74 Pt I s 1 (Eng.).
62 Vakante v. Addey & Stanhope Sch., [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1065 (Eng.). at para. 24, 27.
63 Id. at para. 26.
64 Id. at para. 27.
65 Id. at para. 36.
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C.

Analysis

The Court of Appeal in Vakante applied reasoning similar to that of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Hoffman. Essentially both courts based their decision on the
legal principle of ex turpi causa non oritur actio, which provides that a cause of
action cannot be founded on an immoral or illegal act, or a transgression of positive law. 6 6 One main policy behind this principle is that the plaintiff should not
be granted relief where it would enable him to benefit from his criminal conduct.67 In the context of denying undocumented workers the protections of labor
laws, the argument is that the employee cannot receive the benefits of the law
because the employment that gave rise to the benefits was illegally created or
could not have been created except in violation of the law.
Another major policy behind the principle of denying legal protections to undocumented workers is deterrence. 68 Nevertheless, this approach will not necessarily dissuade unauthorized employees from staying and working in countries
like the United States or the United Kingdom. To begin with, it is unlikely that
the undocumented workers know that they will be denied protections under domestic labor laws because of their immigration status. 69 If they do not know that
they are being denied these labor law protections, denial will have no effect on
whether they stay or leave. 70 Even if they were aware, undocumented workers
do not come into the United States or the United Kingdom for the protection of
the respective country's labor laws. 71 As one federal court has put it, "[r]ather it
is the hope of getting a job - at any wage - that prompts most illegal aliens to
cross our borders. '72 Undocumented workers enter the United States or the
United Kingdom regardless of whether they are provided labor law protections,
therefore denying them those protections will not deter them from entering and
73
staying.
Additionally, where there is "joint illegality, knowledge that the other could
not make a claim could equally be an inducement to crime. '74 The courts have
focused only on deterring undocumented workers, but have failed to examine
what effect their decisions have had in discouraging labor law violations commit66 THE LAW COMM'N, CONSULTATION PAPER No 154 - ILLEGAL TRANSACTIONS: THE EFFECT OF

86 (1999) [hereinafter LAW COMM'N, ILLEGAL TRANSACTIONS].
67 THE LAW COMM'N, CONSULTATION PAPER No 160 - THE ILLEGALrr DEFENCE IN TORT: A CON-

ILLEGALITY ON CONTRACTS AND TRUSTS

SULTATION PAPER 74-77 (2001) [hereinafter LAW COMM'N, THE ILLEGALITY DEFENCE].
68 Id. at 72-74. Additional policy reasons behind the principle are upholding the dignity of the courts
and punishment. LAW COMM'N, ILLEGAL TRANSACTIONS, supra note 66, at 86-89. As neither the U.K.
nor U.S. courts have used these other policy reasons for denying undocumented workers labor law protections, only the policies of deterrence and prohibiting profit from the plaintiff's own wrongdoing will
be examined.
69 Thomas J. Walsh, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: How the Supreme Court Eroded
Labor Law and Workers Rights in the Name of Immigration Policy, 21 LAW & INEQ. 313, 331-32 (2003).
70 See generally id.
71 Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 704-05 (11th Cir. 1988).
72 Id. at 704-05.
73 See generally id.
74 LAW COMM'N, THE ILLEGALITY DEFENCE , supra note 67, at 73.
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ted by employers. Awarding back pay to an unauthorized employee not only
compensates the employee, but also admonishes the employer who violated the
law. 75 The U.S. Supreme Court itself admitted that back pay was one of the
more effective remedies under the NLRA. 76 "In the absence of the back pay
weapon, employers could conclude that they can violate the labor laws at least
once with impunity. ' 77 By failing to provide effective relief to undocumented
workers and by focusing on only deterring undocumented workers, the courts not
to deter the employer's illegal labor practices, but in fact sanction
only fail
78
them.
The undocumented worker who seeks a legal remedy does not do so for profit
or benefit, but rather as compensation for the illegal act of the employer. 79 While
the undocumented worker is potentially entitled to mere compensation, the employer enjoys pecuniary benefits by violating labor laws with no effective implications. Although both parties are in pari delicto, the courts ultimately punish the
unauthorized employment of the undocumented employee without sanctioning
the employer's unlawful conduct. 80 Thus, by refusing to provide remedies to
undocumented workers, courts incorrectly overplay the potential threat posed by
condoning illegal conduct by the undocumented worker in relation to the harm
that results from the employer's violation of the law.
Additionally, in determining whether condoning the illegality of the undocumented employee's conduct is a significant concern, the seriousness of the misconduct must be considered. 8 1 In this case, the employee's illegal conduct is, in
itself, his or her unauthorized employment. While both the United States and the
United Kingdom have laws preventing the illegal employment of undocumented
workers, data indicates that little is done to prevent or punish such practices by
way of enforcement. 82 The seriousness of unauthorized employment is questionable when laws are not even enforced to prevent it.
Another similarity between the United States and the United Kingdom is that
the agencies that enforce employer sanctions are different from the agencies enforcing labor laws. In the United States, immigration officers enforce sanctions
83
with very little cooperation between the labor and immigration departments.
Such cooperation is rare because the labor department recognizes that interagency collaboration would make it difficult to enforce labor laws. 84 For exam75 Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc., v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 160 (2002) (Breyer, S., dissenting).
76 Sure-Tan, Inc., v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904 (1983) (Breyer, S., dissenting).
77 Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 154 (Breyer, S., dissenting).
78 GEN. AccT. OFF., GARMENT INDUSTRY: EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE PREVALENCE AND CONDITIONS

OF SWEATSHOPS 8 (1994) (noting a higher incidence of labor violations in areas with large populations of
undocumented aliens).
79 LAW COMM'N, THE ILLEGALITY DEFENCE, supra note 67, at 75.
80 Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 146, 150.
81 Vakante v. Addey & Stanhope Sch., [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1065 (Eng.) at para. 9.
82 Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Who Left the Door Open?, TIME, Sep. 21, 2004, at 51.
83 Martin & Miller, supra note 2, at 1.
84 Id. at 34.
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their emple, undocumented employees would not be willing to testify against
5
deported.
and
arrested
be
would
they
that
knew
they
if
ployers
The divide between enforcement of labor laws and employer sanctions indicates a disconnect between labor and immigration policy in the United States and
the United Kingdom. Instead of viewing illegal employment as a labor law violation, the United States and the United Kingdom consider it only an immigration
violation. 86 However, the illegal employment of undocumented foreigners can
be addressed as both a labor policy issue and an immigration policy issue.
IH.

Countries That Provide Equivalent Labor Protections To

Undocumented Workers And Authorized Workers
A.

Germany

The Employment Promotion Act (Arbeitsfoerderungsgesetzor AFG) 87 delineates employer sanctions in Germany. Employer sanctions law was first enacted in
1972 in Germany and has undergone several revisions since then. 88 Currently,
the maximum fine for an employer who employs an undocumented worker is
500,000 Euros ($651,704).89 An employer can also receive a fine of 50,000 Euros ($33,323) for obtaining a work permit for a foreign worker under false pretenses through the provision of false information on wages, work hours, or other
working conditions. 90 An employer also faces criminal sanctions of up to oneyear imprisonment if the employer employs more than five undocumented workers for more than thirty days. 91 For particularly serious violations, an employer
may face up to three years in prison. 92 Additionally, if an employer is found to
have employed undocumented workers, the employer is responsible for paying
repatriation costs and any taxes or social insurance in arrears. 93 Employers who
three
have been fined more than 5,000 Euros ($3,332) or sentenced to more than
94
years.
two
for
contracts
public
from
excluded
be
can
prison
in
months
85 Id. at 35.
86

Id. at 1, 31.

87 In 1998, the AFG was re-codified and the law was incorporated into Sozialgesetzbuch III (Social
Insurance Code IL1). Id. at 20-2 1; Hubertus Schick, Job Rotation from the Perspective of Enterprises,
Employees and Political Decisionmakers- Expectations and Results Illustratedby the Example of 'Job
Rotation for the Bremen Region', in AGORA VI JOB ROTATION 86 (Eur. Ctr. for the Dev. of Vocational

Training ed., 2002).
88 Martin & Miller, supra note 2, at 20-22.
89 FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,

NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR EMPLOYMENT POLICY

2003 32

(2003).
90 Rainer Irlenkaueuser, Combating the IrregularEmployment of Foreignersin Germany: Sanctions

against Employers and Key Areas of IrregularEmployment, in COMBATING
OF FOREIGN WORKERS 153 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. 2000).
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The German Department of Labor enforces employer sanctions laws. 95 The
Ministry had 184 offices in 1996.96 Some of these offices included special enforcement teams created to prevent undocumented foreign worker employment. 97
There were about 1,600 inspectors and an additional 840 inspectors appointed
specifically for inspection of construction sites. 9 8 Also, there were some 1,000
employees of the former West-East German customs office assigned to labor law
enforcement in the mid-1990s. 99
Germany spends five times more per worker than the United States to prevent
the employment of unauthorized workers.1 o Germany spends almost $3 per
worker per year in contrast to the United States, which spends about $0.66 per
worker a year.10 ' Some commentators have stated that this is more than any
other country spends on employer sanctions enforcement activities. 102
Germany also has passed stringent laws to prevent the exploitation of undocumented workers and to provide undocumented workers the same labor rights as
authorized workers. 10 3 A German employer who deviates substantially in the
working conditions it provides to undocumented workers as compared to similarly situated authorized workers faces punishment of up to three years in
prison.104 A prison sentence of six months to five years is available in particularly serious cases.10 5
Unlike in the United Kingdom or the United States, German authorities also
try to provide back wages owed to illegal workers by employers. 10 6 Additionally, German prosecutors can ask courts to fine employers the equivalent of any
profits they derived from employing illegal workers.10 7 The intent in passing
these laws has been to maintain fair competition in the labor market.'l0
Acknowledging that many undocumented workers may be exploited through
small subcontracting companies, especially in the construction industry, Germany has passed even tougher laws dealing with subcontractors' failure to provide foreign workers with minimally acceptable working conditions.' 0 9

96

Martin & Miller, supra note 2, at 21.
Id.

97

Id.

95

98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.

10! Id.at 22.
102

Id.

Id. at 21.
Arbeitsfoerderungsgesetz [AFG] [Employment Promotion Act] 1972, § 227a; Irlenkaueuser, supra
note 90, at 153.
103
104

105

Id.

106 Martin & Miller, supra note 2, at 21.
107 Id.
108 Irlenkaueuser, supra note 90, at 153.

109 In 1998, most of the cases of illegal employment were in the construction industry. Martin &
Miller, supra note 2, at 21. In June 1999, over half of the 66 foreign construction firms inspected in the
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Subcontractors who employ foreign workers in violation of minimum working
conditions for these workers (e.g. do not pay them minimum wage) face a fine of
1,000,000 Euros ($666,469). t t ° General contractors who knowingly or negligently allow subcontractors to employ foreign workers below minimum working
conditions also face a fine of 1,000,000 Euros ($666,469).111 In order to hold
general contractors liable, courts are required to find only negligence, as opposed
to gross negligence." 2 Furthermore, employers must pay for their contract employees' work permits; if an employer requires reimbursement for the cost of the
permit, the employer can be fined 50,000 Euros ($33,323).113
. In fighting the illegal employment of undocumented workers, Germany focuses its enforcement efforts on employers, as opposed to employees. 14 This is
due to that fact that employers make a substantial profit by exploiting undocumented workers.1 15 German authorities have declared that such exploitation distorts the labor market.' 16 Rainer Irlenkaueuser, Director of the Ministry of Labor
and Social Affairs, wrote that "[i]n Germany the irregular employment of foreigners is considered socially harmful, undesirable from the point of view of
labor market policy and as having [a] negative effect on fair competition."' 1 7
Statistics for 2003 indicate that there were a total of 59,630 penalties issued
and criminal prosecutions initiated against employers and employees. 1 8 The
most recent enforcement statistics the author was able to obtain relating to enforcement actions taken against employers of undocumented workers date from
1998.119 During that year, 47,400,000 Euros ($29,197,936) in fines were levied
against employers of unauthorized workers. 120 Additionally, fines totaling
580,000 Euros ($357,281) were imposed on employers who employed undocumented temporary workers, while general contractors paid 910,000 Euros
($560,526) for the indirect employment of undocumented workers. 12 1 Recent
data on enforcement activities against employers and employees indicates a trend
1 22
of increasing enforcement against employers.
State of Baden-Wuirttemberg in Southwest Germany violated German labor laws by not paying their
foreign workers the legal minimum wage. Id.
110 Irlenkaueuser, supra note 90, at 153.
III Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.

114 See generally id.
115Id. at 152.
116 Id.

117 Id.
118 MIGRATnON REVrEw 2004, supra note 15, at 115.

119 Irlenkaueuser, supra note 90, at 153.
120 Id.
121

Id.

122 See FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, supra note 89, at 32; MIGRATION REvmw 2004, supra note

15, at 59; Martin & Miller, supra note 2, at 77.
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B.

South Korea

In South Korea, the Immigration Control Act is the primary authority detailing
23
the country's prohibitions against the employment of undocumented workers.1
Originally enacted on March 5, 1963, the Act has been amended twelve times,
with the most recent amendment dating December 5, 2002.124 It makes it illegal
for employers to employ or solicit for employment unauthorized foreign workers. 125 The Act provides that an employer who employs or solicits for employment an undocumented worker is subject to three years imprisonment and a fine
not exceeding 20,000,000 won ($19,265).126 An employer is also liable for the
127
repatriation costs of any undocumented workers it has employed.
In a more recent legislative measure, South Korea promulgated the Act on the
Foreign Workers' Employment, etc. ("Employment Permit Act") 1 28 on August
16, 2003. The Employment Permit Act offers amnesty to many undocumented
workers in South Korea, provides more stringent enforcement for foreign workers' labor rights, and implements a temporary worker program.12 9 A primary motivation in passing the law was to prevent the exploitation of both documented
130
and undocumented foreign workers.
Under the Employment Permit Act, additional penalties were created for employers of foreign workers. 13 1 An employer who fails to obtain the necessary
work permit for a foreign worker faces a fine of 10,000,000 won ($9,632) and
imprisonment for one year. 132 In order to protect the labor rights of undocumented workers, an employer may be barred from legally employing foreign
workers if the employer violates either a foreign worker's contract or any laborrelated laws covering undocumented workers. 133 When the employer loses this
123Immigration Control Act, Law No. 1289 (1963) (S.Korea), available at http://unpanl.un.org/intra
doc/groups/public/documentsAPCITYUNPANOI 1498.pdf.
124 Id. at Introduction.
125 Id. art. 18.
126 Id. art. 94.
127 Id. art. 90-2(1).
128 Act on Foreign Workers' Employment, etc., Law No. 6967 (2003) (S. Korea), availableat http:Il
www.welco.or.kr/english/e main.asp (last visited Oct. 9, 2005).
129 See id.; Ki Sup Kwon, Dir. of Foreign Employment Div., Presentation Before the 3rd Meeting of
the Immigration Policy Forum: The Prospects and Challenges for the Employment Permit System, at 17
(June 17, 2004) (translated Summary Report), available at http://www.immigration.go.kr/ipf/. ("A total
of 184,000 undocumented foreign workers, or 81% of the estimated total, filed for and were granted legal
working permits during the grace period from September 1, 2003, through November 30, 2003.") DaeHwan Kim, 2004 Labor Policies (April 19, 2004), availableat http://152.99.129.68:8787/English/libr/sub
_Contentl.jsp.
130 Ki Sup Kwon, supra note 129, at 5; REPUBLIC OF KOREA INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION BUREAU,

LABOR ADMINISTRATION 2004 17 (2003), availableat http:152.99.129.68:8787/board/pds-view.jsp?idx
=77&code=A&pageNum=0&searchWord=&searchType=null.
131 Act on Foreign Workers' Employment, etc. art. 29 (S.Korea).
132 Id. arts. 8(5), 29(1).
133 Id. art. 19. "'The Government has also declared that employers reported to have abused foreign
workers are subject to criminal charges and can be disadvantaged in the Government's allocation of jobs
for foreign workers.") U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES

-

2000: REPUBLIC OF KOREA, §6 (2001), available at
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right, the foreign workers who were employed by the employer at that time may
then transfer to another employer.13 4 However, if the employer continues to employ foreign workers or attempts to obstruct the foreign worker's right to transfer, the employer faces a fine of 10,000,000 won ($9,632). 135 Thus, the
Employment Permit Act provides the foreign worker some protection when reporting employers who violate labor laws.
The Employment Permit Act specifies both documented, and undocumented,
"foreign workers in Korea are accorded the same legal rights as Korean workers,
such as the right to join labor unions, minimum wage guarantees, and industrial
accident insurance."' 136 Government officials have added that undocumented
workers who have had their wages withheld, suffered industrial accidents, or
filed suits against employers will be allowed to extend their stay until these issues have been resolved. 137 However, this was not the first time that the Korean
government had contemplated suspending removal proceedings to protect the labor rights of undocumented workers. Since 2000, the Ministry of Justice has
periodically postponed deportations for undocumented workers waiting for back
pay, medical care, compensation for industrial accidents, or the resolution of lawsuits against employers. 138 Furthermore, even if the employee returns or is removed to his or her country, an employer is still required to provide the
undocumented employee any back wages due.' 39 An employer who fails to pay
back wages to a terminated foreign worker can be fined 10,000,000 won
($9,632). 140
In addition to the Employment Permit Act, the Korean government has utilized other means to provide undocumented workers the same labor protections
as documented workers. In fact, for several years counseling centers have heard
complaints from foreign workers about overdue wages and industrial accidents. 14 Regional labor offices have also assisted foreign workers in collecting
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/eap/723.htm [hereinafter DEP'T OF STATE REPORTS 2000]; U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN

RIGHTS PRACTICES - 2001: REPUBLIC OF KOREA,

§6 (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/

hrrpt/2001/eap/8336.htm [hereinafter DEP'T OF STATE REPORTS 2001].
134 Act on Foreign Workers' Employment, etc. art. 25 (S. Korea).
135Id. art. 29(4).
136 Sean Hayes, Columnist, New Work System Benefits Migrants, THE KOREA HERALD, Aug. 15, 2003.
137 Press Release, Republic of Korea Ministry of Justice, Roundup of Illegal Foreign Workers to
Begin (Nov. 17, 2003), available at http://www.moj.go.kr.
138 DEP'T OF STATE REPORTS 2000, supra note 133; DEP'T OF STATE REPORTS 2001, supra note 133;
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN

RIGHTS AND LABOR, COUNTRY REPORTS ON

HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - 2002: REPUBLIC OF KOREA, §6 (2003), available at http://www.state.gov/g/

drl/rlslhrrptI2002/18250.htm [hereinafter DEP'T OF STATE REPORTS 2002]; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BUREAU
OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES - 2003:

REPUBLIC OF KOREA, §6 (2004) available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/ris/hrrpt/2003/27776.htm [hereinafter DEP'T OF STATE REPORTS 2003].

139 Act on the Foreign Workers' Employment, etc. art. 16 (S.Korea).
140 Id. art. 29(2).
141

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, COUNTRY REPORTS

ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES for 1999: REPUBLIC OF KOREA, §6 (2000) http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/1999/292.htm [hereinafter DEP'T OF STATE REPORTS 1999]; DEP'T OF STATE REPORTS 2000, supra
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back wages.' 42 In 2000, the Ministry of Justice announced the establishment of
the Foreign Workers Human Rights Commission, which was created to "address
employer mistreatment of foreign workers, such as beatings, forced detention,
withheld wages, and seizure of passports."' 14 3 Since its establishment, the Commission has met several times to hear complaints and to discuss inter-agency
methods to protect foreign workers." 44
In furtherance of Korea's labor and immigration policies, several government
agencies have been granted jurisdiction to enforce laws related to the employment of undocumented workers. 14 5 For example, the Ministry of Labor has jurisdiction to enforce the Employment Permit Act.1 46 It conducts inspections and
investigations, as well as sets up counseling and education services for foreign
workers. 147 On the other hand, the Ministry of Justice and the Law Enforcement
Agency are the primary agencies in charge of enforcing employer sanctions
under the Immigration Control Act. 148 As many as five government agencies
may be involved in enforcement efforts, including the Justice Ministry, the Labor
the National Maritime
Ministry, the Small and Medium Business Administration,
149
Policy Agency and the National Policy Agency.
Since the Employment Permit Act was promulgated on August 16, 2003, there
have been large-scale enforcement efforts against undocumented workers and
their employers. 150 Kwon Ki Sup, Director of Foreign Employment Division,
Ministry of Labor, has stated that South Korea's strategy under the Employment
Permit Act is to step up enforcement of employer sanctions. 1 5 1 In 2004, there
were at least five reported major crackdowns in the construction, manufacturing,
and video game parlor industries, during which hundreds of undocumented workers were arrested.' 52 These large-scale enforcement efforts directed towards unnote 133; DEP'T OF STATE REPORTS 2001, supra note 133;
138.
142 DEP'T OF STATE REPORTS 2002, supra note 138.

DEP'T OF STATE REPORTS

2002, supra note

143 Id.
144 DEP'T OF STATE REPORTS 2003, supra note 138.
145

See id; Act on the Foreign Workers' Employment, etc. art. 4(4) (S. Korea).

146

See Act on the Foreign Workers' Employment, etc. art. 5 (S. Korea).

Id. at arts. 5, 21, 24, 26; Enforcement Decree of the Act on Foreign Workers' Employment, etc.,
Presidential Decree No. 18314 art. 23(2) (Mar. 17, 2004) (S. Korea), availableat http://www.welco.or.
kr/english/law/down-files/decree%20of%20foreign.pdf.
148 KOREA LABOUR WELFARE CORP., PUBLIC NOTICE FOR FOREIGN WORKERS AND THEm EMPLOYERS
(2004), available at http://www.welco.or.kr/english/news/2004/notice(040210).htm.
149 Press Release, Republic of Korea Ministry of Justice, Government Crackdown on Illegal Aliens
Begins Next Week (Nov. 13, 2003), available at http://www.moj.go.kr.
147

150 See Press Release, Republic of Korea Ministry of Justice, Government to Crack Down on Illegal
Aliens (Feb. 21, 2004), available at http://www.moj.go.kr.
151 Ki Sup Kwon, supra note 129, at 6.
152 Press Release, Republic of Koreas Ministry of Justice, Justice Ministry Uncovers 140 Illegal Foreign Workers (Aug. 23, 2004), available at http://www.moj.go.kr (last visited Oct. 10, 2005); Press
Release, Republic of Korea Ministry of Justice, Crackdown Uncovers 305 Illegal Foreign Workers (Nov.
27, 2004), available at http://www.moj.go.kr.
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documented workers have been coupled
with doubled penalties against
153
employers who employ those workers.
IV. A System Which Combines Both Labor and Immigration Policies
More Effectively Combats the Unauthorized Employment of
Undocumented Workers
In contrast to the United States and the United Kingdom, South Korea and
Germany have implemented and enforced employment sanctions laws in a stringent manner. Also distinguishable from the United Kingdom, both Germany and
South Korea provide for imprisonment as a criminal penalty against employers
who employ undocumented workers. 154 In comparison to the United States,
which also provides for imprisonment penalties as a possible sanction, the poten55
tial imprisonment sentences imposed by Germany and South Korea are longer. 1
Furthermore, unlike the United States and the United Kingdom, Germany and
South Korea require employers to pay the costs of repatriating the undocumented
workers they once employed. 156 In terms of applying governmental resources to
enforcing employer sanctions, Germany has invested much more than either the
United States or the United Kingdom, obtaining millions of dollars in fines as a
result. 157 Additionally, whereas the United Kingdom and the United States have
decreased enforcement, South Korea has instead increased employer penalties in
addition to pursuing greater
enforcement actions targeting the employment of
158
undocumented workers.
The relatively minimal efforts taken by the United States and the United Kingdom in enforcing employer sanctions, when compared to Germany and South
Korea, undermine one of the key rationales of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
in Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc., v. NLRB. The Hoffman Court held that
because IRCA "'forcefully' made combating the employment of illegal aliens
central to '[t]he policy of immigration law,"' undocumented workers are unable
to receive the same remedies as authorized workers. 159 Although South Korea
and Germany are much more forceful in combating the employment of undocumented workers than either the United States or the United Kingdom, they still
provide greater access to the same labor law remedies as those afforded to authorized workers. Thus, in contrast to the Supreme Court's opinion in Hoffman,
South Korea and Germany demonstrate that just because a country promulgates
153 Press Release, Republic of Korea Ministry of Justice, Harsher Penalties Set for Employment of
Illegal Foreign Workers (Oct. 9, 2003), available at http://www.moj.go.kr [hereinafter Harsher
Penalties].
154 Asylum and Immigration Act, 1996, c. 49, § 8 (Eng.); Irlenkaueuser, supra note 90, at 154; Immigration Control Act art. 94 (S. Korea).
155 Irlenkaueuser, supra note 90, at 154; Immigration Control Act art. 94 (S. Korea); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(f) (1952).
156 Immigration Control Act art. 90-2 (S. Korea); Irlenkaueuser, supra note 90, at 153.
157
158

Martin & Miller, supra note 2, at 21, 22; Irlenkaueuser, supra note 90, at 152.
Harsher Penalties, supra note 153.

159 Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149 (2002) (citing INS v. Nat'l Ctr. for
Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194, n. 8 (1991)).
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employer sanctions does not mean that it also intends or would allow undocumented workers to be deprived of legal remedies or any additional protections
afforded to documented workers.
The efforts to stop the exploitation of undocumented foreign workers by Germany and South Korea also serve to stop the illegal trafficking of people. 160 The
International Labor Organization recommends that one of the necessary requirements in a comprehensive plan to halt human trafficking is the "[e]nforcement of
minimum national employment conditions standards in all sectors of activity, to
serve as a complementary system of criminalizing abuse of persons and of discouraging irregular employment." 16 1 Providing undocumented workers with the
same labor law remedies as documented workers is one of the best methods of
enforcing minimum working conditions and deterring the exploitation of undocumented workers.162 Germany and South Korea exemplify the notion that immigration policy is compatible with labor policy by combining the former's policy
latter's aim of progoal of stopping illegal trafficking of human beings with the 163
viding labor protection to those working inside the country.
As described above, Germany and South Korea use both labor law enforcement agencies and cooperation between various types of agencies to enforce employer sanctions. This practice also occurs in many other European countries
where labor department inspectors are used to both enforce labor laws and employer sanctions.1 64 As these examples demonstrate, there can be compatible
immigration and labor policies that work to prevent unauthorized employment
while at the same time promoting labor rights for undocumented workers.
V.

Conclusion

Maintaining the fight against the employment of illegal aliens as a central
tenet of a country's immigration policy does not automatically lead to the conclusion that immigration policy is more important than labor policy, nor does it
imply that the goals of one are incompatible with that of the other. In order to
appreciate the commonality between immigration and labor policy, one must recognize the deeper policy objectives behind employer sanctions, including the
160 See PATRICK A. TARAN

& GLORIA

MORENO-FONTES CHAMMARTIN, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OR-

GANIZATION, GETTING AT THE ROOTS: STOPPING THE EXPLOITATION OF MIGRANT WORKERS BY ORGAN-

IZED CRIME, 15 (2003) available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/dwresources/dwbrowse.page?p-lang=en&ptool id= 132.
161 Id.
162 See Sure-Tan Inc., v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904 (1984); Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an
Interconnected World: Going Beyond the Dichotomies ILO's COMMITTEE ON FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION,
REPORT No. 332: COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES PRESENTED BY AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND THE CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (AFL-CIO) AND THE

609 (2003) available at http://www.ilo.org/public/
CONFEDERATION OF MEXICAN WORKERS (CTM),
english/bureau/inst/edy/cornell05/aflcio.pdf.
163 See Colin L. Powell, No Country Left Behind, FOREIGN PoL'Y, Jan./Feb. 2005, available at 2005
WLNR 74766 (former U.S. Secretary of State calling for international partnerships to stop the illegal
trafficking of persons).
164 Martin & Miller, supra note 2, at 1, 4.
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preservation of jobs, working conditions, and wages for the country's workers. 165
As the employer sanctions systems of Germany and South Korea indicate, enforcement of labor laws actually fosters immigration policy by discouraging
em166
ployers from hiring undocumented workers that they can exploit.
As Ruben Garcia has observed, "[h]istorically, immigration law and labor law
have not been linked in the policymaking process. This disconnect has led to a
failure to see immigration as a labor issue and vice versa."' 167 Accordingly, there
must be an integrated approach if a country is to harmonize immigration and
labor policy. Unless otherwise indicated by law, a country's courts should not
assume that the policy of employer sanctions automatically disallows equal labor
law remedies for undocumented workers. Countries need to recognize that enforcement of labor laws is compatible with the enforcement of immigration laws
and that equal enforcement of labor laws for all workers can simultaneously further both labor and immigration policy. Taking into mind the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights' advice, differential treatment between documented
workers and undocumented workers is only permissible to the extent
it is "rea168
sonable, objective, proportionate and does not harm human rights."'

165 See Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 893; H.R. REP. No. 99-682 (I), at 48, 90-91, 124 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5652, 5694, 5728; H.R. REP. No. 99-682 (II), at 9 (1986) reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757, 5758; Martin & Miller, supra note 2, at 1.
166 See Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 704-5 (11 th Cir. 1988).
167 Garcia, supra note 162, at 740.
168 Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Juridical Status and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, InterAm. Ct. H.R.(ser. A) No. 18, at 119 (Sept. 17, 2003), availableat http://www.corteidh.or.cr/seriapdfjing/
seriea_18_ing.pdf (last visited Oct 25, 2005) (holding that Hoffman decision violated undocumented
workers' equal protection and due process rights).
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